Cavalry In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign Of 1862: Effective, But Inefficient by Major Michael Sullivan Lynch

Author:Major Michael Sullivan Lynch [Lynch, Major Michael Sullivan]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, United States, Civil War Period (1850-1877), Military, Modern, 19th Century
ISBN: 9781782899150
Google: yyFwCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2014-08-15T05:03:04+00:00

Surprise at McDowell (30 April – 18 May)

After arriving at Conrad’s Store, Jackson spent the last days of April formulating a plan for future operations in the Valley. Since the Battle of Kernstown, Jackson had been looking for an opportunity to take the offensive. Jackson’s planning was conducted in close coordination with General E. Lee who was acting as Davis’ military advisor. Lee was increasingly involved in directing military movements because Johnston was significantly busy with the defense of Richmond. Through a series of letters that started on 21 April, Jackson and Lee developed the situation from which Jackson developed his plan.{255}

Lee’s exact duties remained unclear, but in practice, Lee was able to coordinate and direct the more remote Confederate forces operating in Virginia. Included among these remote forces were those of Brigadier General Charles Field in Fredericksburg, Brigadier General Edward Johnson west of Staunton, Major General Ewell west of the Blue Ridge, and Major General Jackson in the Valley. Arrayed against the Confederates, including those under the direction on General Johnston, were the four Federal armies of McClellan, McDowell, Banks, and Frémont. (See Figure 6.)

Lee’s primary concern was the increasing threat of Federal forces near Fredericksburg. Though Lee left the selection of the course of action up to Jackson, Lee’s intent was for Jackson to take an offensive action to reduce the possibility of the Federals opening another front against Richmond along the Fredericksburg line of advance.{256}

“The blow, wherever struck, must, to be successful, must be sudden, and heavy. The troops used must be sufficient and light.{257}”

After contemplating several options, Jackson elected to join his army with the command of Brigadier General Edward Johnson in an effort to drive back Frémont’s advance guard under command of Brigadier General Robert H. Milroy. After driving Milroy back, Jackson would combine his force with Ewell’s force and concentrate on driving Banks’ army from the Valley. If successful, a Confederate advance down the Valley would place McDowell’s flank at risk, thus preventing McDowell from advancing on Richmond to join McClellan.{258}

For their part, the Federals had plans of their own. Because of the strong pronouncements by Banks and Shields about the safety of the Valley, the Washington leadership was convinced they could now send additional troops east. On 26 April, Lincoln ordered Banks to stop his advance south. Shields was to prepare to join McDowell in the Rappahannock Department. On 1 May, Secretary Stanton directed Banks to retire to Strasburg and then send Shields’ division from there to join McDowell.{259}

McDowell’s army, reinforced by Shields to about 40,000, would then proceed south and join McClellan’s advance on Richmond. Banks, reduced to less than 10,000 after transferring Shields’ division, would control the Valley from Strasburg.{260}

Unknown to both sides at the time, the Federal plan actually reduced the risk of Jackson’s plan. Jackson set his plan into motion on the morning of 30 April. This occurred two days after Banks declared, “The enemy is in no condition for offensive operations.”{261} Banks began initiating his withdrawal towards Strasburg on 1 May.

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